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Questions concerning the locus of selective attention have played
a central role in the study of attention for decades, (see Johnston
and Dark, 1986; Lachter et al., 2004, for reviews). According to
early selection views (e.g., Broadbent, 1958; von Wright, 1968;
Neisser, 1967; Treisman, 1969; Moran andDesimone, 1985), there
is initial, involuntary, parallel processing of the physical charac-
teristics of all stimuli. Based on the information derived from
this initial analysis, a stimulus can be selected by attention for
further processing to determine its meaning. Thus, unattended
stimuli are not processed to the semantic level. On the other
hand, late-selection accounts (e.g., Deutsch and Deutsch, 1963;
Norman, 1968; Duncan, 1980; Tipper, 1985) hold that selection
occurs later in the information processing stream such that there
is also an initial, involuntary, parallel semantic processing of all
stimuli. Hence, both the physical characteristics and the identities
of unattended stimuli are processed.
Based on a distinction initially made by Kahneman and
Treisman (1984), Lavie and Tsal (1994; Lavie, 1995) noted a fun-
damental difference between the two groups of studies described
above. While early selection theories have relied on paradigms
which were characterized in high display set size (e.g.,visual search
paradigms) (for a review, see Pashler and Johnston, 1998), studies
which supported the late selection views involved small display set
sizes, usually no more than two different items, a target and a dis-
tractor (e.g., Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974; Keren et al., 1977; Gatti
and Egeth, 1978; Kahneman and Henik, 1981; Hagenaar and van
der Heijden, 1986; Miller, 1987; Paquet and Lortie, 1990). On the
basis of this critical observation Lavie has developed her hybrid
theory of selective attention. According to this theory, processing
load of the relevant task determines the extent to which irrelevant
distractors are processed. With a low load in relevant process-
ing, leftover resources inevitably spillover to process irrelevant
information. The processing of irrelevant distractors could be
prevented only when the high load in relevant processing exhausts
all attentional resources.
Various studies supported the predictions of perceptual load
theory (e.g., Lavie and Cox, 1997; Rees et al., 1997, 2001; Maylor
and Lavie, 1998; Lavie and Fox, 2000; Forster and Lavie, 2007,
2008) mostly using display set size for manipulating percep-
tual load. Thus, in the Low-Load Condition the target appeared
by itself in one of several possible positions. In the High-Load
Condition the target was embedded among several neutral let-
ters. Distractor interference was measured by the effect of an
incongruent relative to a neutral or congruent distractor appear-
ing somewhat remotely from the target. Typically, substantial
interference was observed under the Low-Load Condition, but
was either markedly reduced or completely eliminated under the
High-Load Condition. This finding was interpreted as supportive
of load theory (e.g., Lavie, 1995) by assuming that reduced inter-
ference under the High-Load Condition is due to the fact that
a great deal of attentional resources was required for searching
the target among neutral items, leaving no spare resources to be
captured by the irrelevant distractor.
Over the past two decades perceptual load theory has received
a great deal of attention and has produced considerable impact
in the attention literature. The present paper closely examines the
basic tenets and assumptions of the theory as well as consistent
and inconsistent evidence and identifies major conceptual and
methodological flaws in the theory that have been largely ignored
in the literature.
PERCEPTUAL LOAD THEORY IS AN EARLY, NOT A HYBRID,
ACCOUNT OF SELECTIVE ATTENTION
The highly acclaimed contribution of perceptual load theory is
its hybrid resolution of the early-late selection debate. That is,
Perceptual load theory has been presented and recognized as
a hybrid model in which the locus of attentional selection is
flexible, either early or late, depending on the processing load
of the relevant task. However, a closer look suggests that “per-
ceptual load” has been erroneously treated as a hybrid account
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of attentional selection, since it is exclusively an early selection
theory.
The early/late debate can be delineated by two main ques-
tions: (1) At which stage in the information processing stream
attention selects information? (2). To what extent are unat-
tended stimuli processed (or alternatively, which stages in the
information processing stream necessitate attention)? According
to perceptual load theory when prioritized relevant processing
exhausts all of the available resources, irrelevant information
remains unattended and is consequently excluded from process-
ing. Thus, under high load conditions early selection occurs.
Unlike the above, in low load presentations the relevant stim-
uli do not demand all of the available attentional resources, and
spare resources unintentionally spill over to irrelevant stimuli,
consequently enabling their processing. In other words, the the-
ory actually proposes that the semantic processing of distractors
in these displays occurs as a result of attentional allocation over
their locations. This proposal is equivalent to the view that atten-
tion is necessary for semantic processing, and as such, it is strictly
an early selection account. Moreover, since the theory states that
the interference in low load conditions is produced by attentional
allocation over irrelevant information, and not by preattentive
semantic processing of the irrelevant information, the theory
actually states that in principle, attention selects relevant infor-
mation early in processing. Thus, the different patterns obtained
under high load and low load presentations, according to the the-
ory, are due to the efficiency of selection: while under high load
conditions attentional selection is efficient, it is inefficient under
low load conditions. Hence, the theory proposes a single early
locus of selection irrespective of perceptual load, but a flexible
answer regarding the efficiency of selection.
Why is load theory presented in the literature as a hybrid
account concerning the question of the locus of selective atten-
tion? This oversight is probably the result of mistaking the effi-
ciency of selection for the locus of selection. Another reason
for this confusion could stem from the confusion between the
questions of selective attention and selection of relevant from
irrelevant information. The role of attention is indeed to select the
relevant information, but if attention “spills over” to irrelevant
information (as according to load theory, occurs in low load pre-
sentations), attentional selection is inefficient. Yet, the observer
needs to select the relevant information in order to produce the
correct response. Thus, the selection of relevant information from
irrelevant will indeed occur late in processing stream, but it is
important to realize that this late selection is not the attentional
selection, but rather the decision that observers produce through
higher cognitive functions.
In summary, load theory should not be presented as a the-
ory which resolves the early/late debate by suggesting a hybrid
model concerning this debate. Instead, load theory deserves its
recognition for putting aside the archaic question of the locus of
attentional selection, and by shifting the focus of interest to the
more adaptive question: the question of the efficiency of selection.
ALTERNATIVES AND CONFOUNDS
Various studies reported inconsistencies with perceptual load the-
ory and proposed that factors other than perceptual load are
major determinants of efficient selectivity (e.g., Paquet and Craig,
1997; Fournier et al., 2002; Johnson et al., 2002; Murray and
Jones, 2002; Chen, 2003; Theeuwes et al., 2004; Eltiti et al., 2005;
Chen and Chan, 2007; Cosman and Vecera, 2012). Below are a
few examples. Eltiti et al. (2005) argued that the major factor
contributing to effective selection is the relative salience of the tar-
get and the distractor rather than perceptual load. They jointly
manipulated perceptual load and onset (salient) or offset (not
salient) of target and distractors. They found effective selection
for onset target and offset distractor even under low load con-
ditions, and distractor interference for offset target and onset
distractor even under high load conditions. Eltiti et al. (2005)
thus concluded that it is salience rather than load that deter-
mines the efficacy of selection. Evidence against load theory was
also presented by Paquet and Craig (1997) who like Eltiti et al.
(2005), showed efficient selectivity under low load conditions.
They found that efficient selection heavily depends on target-
distractor similarity and that distractor interference could occur
under low load conditions for near but not far distractors, both
for precued and uncued targets.
Chen (2003) showed that increasing perceptual load did not
facilitate selection when both the distracting and the target stim-
uli were part of the same object (see also Kramer and Jacobson,
1991). Cosman and Vecera (2012) further demonstrated that dur-
ing low-load search, filtering out of the flanker was enhanced
when the to-be-ignored letter did not group with the search array
(as in the high load search). Conversely, during high-load search,
task-irrelevant flanker letters still exerted an interference effect if
targets and flankers appeared in the same object (as in the low
load search). They proposed that object based attention effects play
a central role in selective attention regardless of the perceptual
load of the task being performed.
Theeuwes et al. (2004) proposed another alternative. They
argued that high load and low load conditions differ in attentional
set. In the former the subjects are engaged in focused attention
suitable for a serial search whereas in the latter they employ a dis-
tributed mode which is suitable for identifying a single target that
can occur in one of several positions. In support of their claim
they showed that intermixing high load and low load displays
abolish the difference between the two. Consequently, Theeuwes
et al. proposed that advance knowledge of perceptual load level
rather than perceptual load per se, modulates the processing of
irrelevant distractors.
Johnson et al. (2002) argue that mode of attention (focused vs.
distributed) plays an important role in determining distractors
interference. They demonstrated efficient selectivity in low load
displays when precuing the position of the upcoming target as
compared to a no-cue condition. They concluded that the cue in
the low load condition helped participants to engage in selective
and focused processing. A further interpretation for their findings
will be discussed in the next section.
DILUTION vs. PERCEPTUAL LOAD
Tsal and Benoni (2010a,b; Benoni and Tsal, 2010) have argued
that reduction of distractor interference under high load con-
ditions, in set size manipulations, need not be attributed to
increases in perceptual load resulting from the need to search for
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the target among the neutral letters. Instead, it could be due to
the dilution of the distractor by the presence of neutral items
characterizing high load presentations. These neutral items may
play an important role in competing with the distractor for neu-
ronal representation. Indeed, three different studies (Benoni and
Tsal, 2010; Tsal and Benoni, 2010a; Wilson et al., 2011) dis-
tinguished between the possible effects of perceptual load and
dilution by introducing low-load high-dilution displays. These
displays contained neutral letters (as in high load conditions)
capable of diluting the distractor. Yet, either stimulus or process-
ing requirements allowed for a low load processing mode. For
example, in a multiple color display the target color was pre-
known in the low load—high dilution condition but not in the
high load condition (Tsal and Benoni, 2010a). In all experiments
using a variety of converging operations distractor processing
was either completely eliminated for these new displays (Benoni
and Tsal, 2010; Tsal and Benoni, 2010a) or markedly reduced
(Wilson et al., 2011) thereby supporting the conclusion that the
elimination of distractor interference under the high load condi-
tion, repeatedly misattributed to perceptual load, is completely
accounted for by dilution. The alternative dilution interpreta-
tion received further support from additional subsequent studies
(e.g., Dittrich and Stahl, 2011; Marciano and Yeshurun, 2011;
Benoni and Tsal, 2012; Benoni et al., in press; but see (Chen and
Cave, 2013); Chen and Cave, for the role of attentional focus in
dilution). The dilution manipulations produced two additional
important findings. First, when the effect of dilution is properly
controlled for, contrary to predictions of load theory, a reversed
load effect emerges, i.e., it is high perceptual load, not low percep-
tual load, which produces greater distractor interference (Tsal and
Benoni, 2010a;Wilson et al., 2011; Benoni and Tsal, 2012). A sim-
ilar reversed load effect was reported by Chen and Cave (2013).
Second, there is no need to postulate (e.g., Lavie and de Fockert,
2003) that different types of load produce opposite effects of
distractor interference. Instead, when dilution is jointly manip-
ulated with perceptual load, sensory degradation and cognitive
load (Tsal and Benoni, 2011; Benoni and Tsal, 2012) the results
clearly show that when dilution is properly controlled for any
increase in task difficulty (be it perceptual, sensory or cognitive)
increases distractor interference.
THE PROBLEM OF CIRCULARITY AND REFUTATION
What is perceptual load? Perceptual load is a vague term that has
never been clearly and precisely defined and its consequent oper-
ationalizations have been guided primarily by intuitions rather
than by a priori rigorous rules. How ought perceptual load be
operationally defined? Tsal and Benoni (2010a) proposed that as
a hypothetical construct perceptual load needs to be validated by
related observables, either by its antecedents, i.e., related stimulus
observables or by its consequents, i.e., related response observ-
ables. However, it seems that this concept could be verified by
neither. Perceptual load could not be validated by rigorous stimu-
lus manipulations since the manipulation of display size as well
as the difficulty of perceptual operations are both confounded
with sensory and cognitive factors, as will be detailed below. Nor
could it be validated by its dependent measure. Overall reaction
times (RT) (typically used as a manipulation check for perceptual
load) assess overall task difficulty entailing sensory limitations
and cognitive demands, and as such could not be used as a pure
measure of perceptual load. Thus, the major building block of
load theory, perceptual load, is a vague term that has never been
clearly and precisely defined.
The lack of a coherent definition of the concept of perceptual
load has resulted in circularity in the characterization of load,
in the manipulation of load, and in reasoning. In the discussion
bellow we will summarize the situations which illustrate this cir-
cularity and the consequent problem of refutation (Popper, 1959,
1963).
CIRCULARITY IN THE CHARACTERIZATION OF LOAD: IS THIS A
HIGH-LOAD OR A LOW-LOAD CONDITION?
Although overall RT is the main measure that could be used to
assess perceptual load, in some papers it was completely aban-
doned as a manipulation check and replaced by the presence
or absence of distractor interference itself, which is supposed to
be used as a dependent measure for confirming the predictions
of perceptual load theory. For example, Lavie and Cox (1997)
found that increasing display search size from one to four did not
decrease distractor interference although it did increase the over-
all RT. Distractor interference was reduced only from set size six.
Instead of concluding that these data are inconsistent with pre-
dictions of load theory, the authors concluded that “as long as the
number of items in the relevant display does not exceed capac-
ity, then irrelevant distractors are not rejected from processing”
(p. 397). Similarly, Lavie and Robertson (2001), in assessing the
effects of perceptual load on neglect, increased display size from
two to three items. This manipulation did not increase overall RT
but reduced distractor interference by almost 200msec. Again, in
the discussion, the authors considered the two conditions above
as low load and high load respectively, although the manipulation
check did not confirm any difference in perceptual load. Clearly,
the absence of any a priori criteria for changes in perceptual load
prevents the theory from standing the refutation criteria (Popper,
1959, 1963).
CIRCULARITY IN THE MANIPULATION OF LOAD: DEFINING LOAD ON
THE BASIS OF STIMULUS RATHER THAN PROCESSING
CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to the circularity associated with the definition of
load, there also exists circularity with respect to how load is con-
ceived and operationalized. Consider, for example, a study by
Johnson et al. (2002). In this study the authors jointly manipu-
lated display size and cuing. Following Lavie and Cox (1997), they
presented a circular configuration containing one target (X or N)
and five neutral letters that were flanked by a distractor. In the low
load condition the neutral letters were all O’s. In the high load
condition the neutral letters were heterogeneous and shared fea-
tures with the targets (and the distractors). Johnson et al. added a
cuing manipulation and presented the displays either with no cue
or with a 100% valid cue that always pointed to the expected tar-
get location. When the cue was absent distractor processing was
evident in the low load condition but not in the high load con-
dition, as predicted by perceptual load theory. However, with the
valid cue there was no distractor processing even when perceptual
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load was low. The authors concluded that their results support
a weak version of perceptual load theory in showing that while
perceptual load is an important factor, it is not the only factor
affecting attentional selection.
Table 1 presents a summary of the results obtained by Johnson
et al. Most illuminating is condition 4. Given the presence
of heterogeneous neutral letters it was inappropriately iden-
tified as a “high load” condition. However, the level of per-
ceptual load should be dictated by processing considerations
rather than by stimulus considerations. Hence, since the target
is cued in advance, the heterogeneous display no longer consti-
tutes a high load condition since the neutral letters need not be
actively searched and could be easily filtered out (e.g., Yantis and
Johnston, 1990). In further validation of this claim, one can see
that the overall RT in this condition is indeed similar to that of
the other two low-load conditions and substantially shorter than
that of the high-load condition. In fact, this condition is similar
to the dilution conditions (characterized by low load and high
dilution) used in our previous studies (Benoni and Tsal, 2010,
2012; Tsal and Benoni, 2010a; Benoni et al., in press). Hence,
the most important aspect of the results concerns the comparison
between conditions 2 and 4 which shows that displays containing
heterogeneous neutral letters with cuing (low load) and without
cuing (high load), although substantially differing in overall RT
(by 275msec) equally reduced the congruency effect to 11msec.
Therefore, as argued by Tsal and Benoni (2010a); Benoni and Tsal
(2010, 2012); Wilson et al. (2011), it is not perceptual load but
rather the dilution resulting from the mere presence of neutral
interfering letters that reduce or eliminate distractor processing.
The study of Johnson et al. (2002) illustrates the problem of
refutation due to the absence of a coherent definition of the con-
cept of perceptual load. Johnston and his colleagues established
their important conclusion on the results obtained from con-
dition 3 (i.e., Valid Cue—Low Load). Since they characterized
condition 4 as High-Load (valid cue) condition they hypoth-
esized a-priory a reduction in interference in this condition,
although reduction of distractor interference in this condition
should undermine the basic tenets of perceptual load theory.
CIRCULAR REASONING: FACE AND EMOTIONAL DISTRACTORS UNDER
“PERCEPTUAL LOAD”
Several studies have manipulated load, not in order to test the
predictions of load theory, but rather to test whether percep-
tion of faces (e.g., Lavie et al., 2003; Reddy and Wilken, 2004) or
emotional stimuli (e.g., Bishop et al., 2007; Okon-Singer et al.,
2007; Fox et al., 2012) requires attention. These studies have
Table 1 | Mean RTs (average of congruent, neutral and incongruent
trials) and congruency effects (incongruent RT—congruent RT) for
each condition in Johnson et al.’s (2002) study.
Condition Mean RT Congruency effect
1. No Cue—Low Load 584 65
2. No Cue—High Load 775 11
3. Valid Cue—Low Load 490 8
4. Valid Cue—High Load* 500 11
*This is, in fact, a Low Load condition characterized by low load and high dilution.
utilized typical load manipulations, but with faces or emotional
stimuli used as distractors. The studies are based on the follow-
ing rationale: If the specific distractor is processed automatically
without attention then it is expected to produce interference, irre-
spective of the level of perceptual load in the task. If, on the other
hand, distractor processing requires attention, then perceptual
load is expected to reduce distractor interference.
The rationale underlying this line of studies is quite problem-
atic as it produces circular reasoning. The basic assumption of
these studies is that the distractors are attended in low load con-
ditions and unattended in high load conditions. The problem is
that this assumption cannot be stated a priori since it serves as
the hypothesis and as the end product of the investigation of load
theory, and since load theory uses the same manipulations of load,
to test this assumption (see Lamy et al., 2013, for a related criti-
cism). That is, for example, if manipulating load does not affect
distractor interference it may indeed suggest that the processing
of this distractor is not affected by attention, or is processed in a
specific module. However, this same result can alternatively sug-
gest that this finding is inconsistent with perceptual load theory
thereby undermining its very basic assumptions. The latter pos-
sibility should not be taken lightly since various studies failed to
replicate the traditional load effects (e.g., Theeuwes et al., 2004;
Nelson et al., 2012, experiment 2; Tsal and Benoni, 2010a, experi-
ments 2 and 4)., and also because the dilution account, discussed
above, suggests that distractor interference does not necessarily
depend on attentional resources. This suggestion is in agreement
with several studies which find that the “flanker effect” is inde-
pendent of spatial attentional resources (e.g., Cohen et al., 1995;
Ro et al., 2002; Gronau et al., 2009). All these arguments strongly
suggest that the notion of automaticity cannot be verified by
manipulations of load.
VAGUENESS OF DEFINITIONS: CAN PERCEPTUAL, COGNITIVE, AND
SENSORY LOADS BE TRULY DISTINGUISHED?
The expanded theory of load has argued that whereas increased
perceptual load reduces irrelevant interference, increased cogni-
tive load (Lavie et al., 2004) and increased sensory load (Lavie and
de Fockert, 2003), in fact, produce the opposite effects. Hence,
perceptual load needs to be precisely defined so that manipula-
tions of perceptual load could a priori be clearly distinguished
from those of cognitive or sensory load so as to rule out any pos-
sible bias in assigning a particular load to a particular pattern
of results obtained. A close review of the literature suggests that
this may be an impossible task because distinctions between these
concepts are often fuzzy.
Lavie et al. (2004) defined cognitive load as a form of control
which “depends on higher cognitive functions, such as work-
ing memory (WM), that are required for actively maintaining
current processing priorities to ensure that low-priority stim-
uli do not gain control of behavior” (p. 339). The problem is
that the most commonly used manipulation of perceptual load
involves visual search, which cannot purely measure perceptual
load because it entails a cognitive component. The operation of
searching requires representing the target template, comparing
the target template to possible candidate items, and categorizing
the items in the search array. Indeed severalmodels have proposed
that visual WM is critical for a number of important operations
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during visual search, (e.g., Duncan and Humphreys, 1989;
Bundesen, 1990). Consistent with this view, evidence from sev-
eral neurophysiological studies have indicated that during visual
search neurons that are selective for the search target often remain
active during a delay period before the onset of the search display.
Interestingly, the same brain areas show template-related activ-
ity during the delay period, followed by an enhanced response
to a matching target during visual WM tasks (e.g., Miller and
Desimone, 1993, 1994). Moreover, cells in inferior temporal (IT)
cortex also show enhanced firing rates during search, just before a
saccadic eye movement toward that target (Chelazzi et al., 1993).
All of these findings led to the conclusion that visual search is just
a variant of a WM task. This conclusion is most strongly sup-
ported by Luria and Vogel (2011) who tested directly the proposal
that perceptual load manipulations by display set size, are actu-
ally WM manipulations. They follow the set-size manipulation
conducted in Lavie and Cox (1997), and used an electrophysio-
logical measure of WM capacity, the contralateral delay activity
(CDA) amplitude, which is a marker forWM capacity (e.g., Vogel
and Machizawa, 2004). Luria and Vogel found that the CDA
amplitude was larger significantly in high load conditions com-
pared to low load conditions, indicating a greater involvement
of WM in the former. As far as the CDA amplitude does indeed
reflectWM, then this finding provides direct evidence to the argu-
ment that perceptual load manipulations are confounded with
memory load manipulations. The argument that perceptual load
manipulations are confounded with those of cognitive load can
be applied to other load manipulations not involving display size.
For example, (Lavie, 1995) (Exp. 2) manipulated perceptual load
by different processing requirements for identical displays. In the
low load condition participants were required to identify a sim-
ple feature (e.g., to press a key only if the figure was red). In the
high-load condition, they were required to perform a conjunction
task (e.g., to react only if the figure was a red square). Obviously,
the high perceptual load condition also imposed greater mem-
ory demands as it required two different sets of combinations of
features to be held in memory. Moreover, Fournier et al. (2002)
have demonstrated that Identification of feature conjunctions
does not increase the perceptual demands on attention. Instead,
slower responses associated with disjunction-conjunction judg-
ments have been shown to be accounted for by differences in
decision activation and/or memory demands (Fournier et al.,
2004). Similar confounds of cognitive and perceptual demands
are evident in other manipulations of perceptual load such as
identifying the letter case vs. counting the number of syllables
(Rees et al., 1997).
Manipulations of perceptual load and sensory degradation
are also heavily confounded. For example, in the study of Lavie
and de Fockert (2003, Exp.3), sensory load was manipulated by
reducing visual acuity owing to position eccentricity of the tar-
get. This manipulation is confounded with perceptual load, since
searching for a more peripheral target is perceptually more diffi-
cult irrespective of its reduced acuity. Empirical support for this
claim is evident in this same Lavie and de Fockert study which
showed a significant interaction between target position and per-
ceptual load. Hence, the mechanisms mediating the effects of
sensory and perceptual manipuolations are not independent. In
a recent study, Fitousi and Wenger (2011) used more powerful
measures as the hazard function of the response time distribution
(Townsend and Ashby, 1978; Wenger and Gibson, 2004), along
with signal detection theory, to test perceptual load theory. They
found that contrary to the assumptions of load theory, perceptual
load does, in fact, induce data limitations. Their findings provide
strong evidence that perceptual load are confounded with sensory
limitations.
The lack of clear distinctions between sensory degradation and
perceptual loadmanipulations have produced confusing results in
the literature. In an ERP study Handy and Mangun (2000) found
that high perceptual load was associated with a decrease of the P1
and N1 components related to the distractor, supposedly in line
with the prediction of load theory. The problem is that the same
effects were obtained when perceptual load was manipulated by
shortening target duration and superimposing a mask at its loca-
tion, which are clearly sensory load manipulations. Similarly, in
a recent fMRI study Yi et al. (2004) found that increasing the
perceptual difficulty of a foveal target task attenuated processing
of task-irrelevant background scenes. Again, the problem with
this interpretation is that perceptual load was manipulated with
sensory degradation, i.e., degrading the central face stimuli with
random salt and pepper noise. It seems that the fuzziness of the
concept of “perceptual load” permitted the assignment of the
results to a particular load which fits the obtained pattern of
results.
SUMMARY
The present paper closely examines the basic tenets and assump-
tions of the theory of perceptual load and identifies various
conceptual and methodological flaws in the theory. The critical
discussion focuses primarily on the definition of perceptual load,
the difficulty in specifying the nature and level of load, the circu-
larity in the characterization of load and the confusion between
the concept of load and its operationalization. Unlike our previous
studies (Benoni and Tsal, 2010, 2012; Tsal and Benoni, 2010a,b;
Benoni et al., in press), the present paper is not restricted to set
size manipulations but rather extends to a general discussion of
load theory pertaining to all manipulations of perceptual load.
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